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Factor Growth and Equalized Factor Prices 
1. Introduction 
 The celebrated Heckscher-Ohlin model developed by Eli Heckscher (1919) and Bertil 
Ohlin contains four theorems.  While attempts have been made to extend the model to many 
industries and factors,1 the two-country, two-factor, two-commodity model can be considered 
complete.2 Among the four cornerstones, the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (1941) considers 
the effect of a tariff on factor prices within a single country, and its effect on the terms of 
trade in a two-country world has received thorough attention. The Rybczynski Theorem 
(1955) considers the effect of factor growth in a single country facing constant prices, but 
such factor growth in one country necessarily affects the terms of trade in a two-country 
framework. The Rybczynski Theorem in virtually all variations of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model is derived for a small open economy facing constant prices. Samuelson (1948, 1949) 
shows that under certain conditions free trade equalizes factor prices between two countries, 
but the factor price equalization theorem does not address at what levels the factor prices will 
be equalized. Factor price equalization is also associated with income convergence.3 
The present paper first analyzes the impact of factor growth on the terms of trade and 
demonstrates under conditions ensuring factor price equalization that factor growth, 
regardless of where it occurs, has the same effect on the terms of trade, and that terms of 
trade depend on the global capital-labor ratio. Second, it shows that the equalized factor 
prices are less than a convex combination of the autarky factor prices. Since the equalized 
output price lies somewhere between two autarky prices, one might expect that the equalized 
factor prices are also a weighted average of autarky factor prices. It is shown that this does 
not occur due to concavity of cost functions. 
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Section 2 presents the basic two-country, two-factor, two-commodity model. Section 
3 examines the impact of factor growth on the terms of trade. Section 4 considers the 
equalized factor prices and Section 5 demonstrates two propositions in the Cobb-Douglas 
case. 
2. The Two-Country Model 
 To investigate the impacts of free trade on the terms of trade and the equalized factor 
prices in an open economy, we employ the following assumptions: 
   (1) Consumers in the South and the North have identical and homothetic preferences. 
   (2) Two factors, capital and labor, are used to produce two goods, 1 and 2. 
   (3) The countries have identical production functions with constant returns to scale.  
   (4) Industry 2 is capital intensive and the North is capital-abundant. 
   (4) Factors are fully employed and mobile between sectors. 
   (5) Perfect competition prevails in product and factor markets. 
   (6) There are no transportation costs or trade barriers. 
The Supply Side 
 Let Y1 and Y2 denote the domestic production of goods 1 and 2 of the South, 
respectively. An asterisk (*) is used to denote variables of the North.  Let 1p and 2p denote 
the prices of goods 1 and 2. In the absence of transport costs and trade barriers, free trade 
equalizes output prices, i.e., *.i ip p=  Since full employment prevails in factor markets, input 
and output relations of the South may be written as 
 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2,  and  ,L L K Ka Y a Y L a Y a Y K+ = + =  (1) 
and full employment conditions in the North are given by 
 4
 * * * * * * * *1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2*,  and  *,L L K Ka Y a Y L a Y a Y K+ = + =  (2) 
where the cost-minimizing input-output coefficients are functions of regional factor prices, 
 * *( , ),    ( *, *).ij ij ij ija a w r a a w r= =  
Let /i i ik K L≡ denote the capital intensity of industry i, i = 1, 2. Since industry 2 is capital 
intensive, 2 1k k> . With the aid of Cramer’s Rule, the outputs of the South are written as: 
 2 2 1 11 2,    ,K L L K
a L a K a K a LY Y− −= =Δ Δ  (3) 
where 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1( ) 0.L K K L L La a a a a a k kΔ = − = − >   
Once factor prices are equalized, the identical technology assumption implies 
*( , ) ( , )ij ija w r a w r=  and ( , ) *( *, *)w r w rΔ = Δ . If factor endowments are within the cone of 
diversification, outputs in the North are given by 
 * *2 2 1 11 2
* * * *,    .K L L Ka L a K a K a LY Y− −= =Δ Δ  (4) 
The world outputs of the two sectors are: 
 * *2 2 1 11 1 2 2
( *) ( *) ( *) ( *),    .K L L Ka L L a K K a K K a L LY Y Y Y+ − + + − ++ = + =Δ Δ  (5) 
These show the total outputs in an integrated world equilibrium as described in Samuelson 
(1949), Dixit and Norman (1980) and Davis and Weinstein (2000).  Once factor prices are 
equalized between countries, even though factors are not mobile between the two countries, 
the world outputs are exactly equal to those when the world is a single country with 
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aggregate resource endowments ( *, *)L L K K+ +  and factors are mobile throughout the 
world. 
 The Rybczynski Theorem deals with the impact of factor growth on the outputs of a 
single country facing constant prices. Each input-output coefficient ( , )ija w r depends on 
factor prices, which in turn depend on output prices. When prices are held constant, ( , )ija w r  
as well as ( , )w rΔ  also are fixed. Let /iL iY Y L≡ ∂ ∂  and / .iK iY Y K≡ ∂ ∂  Differentiating (4) with 
respect to L and K, holding prices constant, we obtain the Rybczynski result: 
 2 1 2 11 2 1 20,   ,   0,   .K K L LL L K K
a a a aY Y Y Y= > = − = − > =Δ Δ Δ Δ  (6) 
From (3) and (6), we have ( , ) ,i iL iKY L K Y L Y K= +  and is homogenous of degree 1 in factor 
endowments. The Reciprocity relation implies the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, 
 2 1 2 1
1 2 1 2
0,   ,   0,   .K K L La a a aw w r r
p p p p
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= > = − = − > =∂ Δ ∂ Δ ∂ Δ ∂ Δ  (7) 
 
Demand Side 
 Consider world demand for two goods. Consumers in the South and North are 
assumed to have identical and homothetic preferences. Their preferences are represented by 
monotone increasing and quasiconcave utility functions, 
 * *1 2 1 2( , ),  and  * ( , ),U U X X U U X X= =  
where 1X  and 2X  denote the South’s consumption of goods 1 and 2, and 
*
1X and 
*
2X  are 
similarly defined for the North.  Recall that the North is abundant in capital and the South in 
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labor. Let good 1 be the numéraire so that 1 1p =  and let 2 1/p p p= be the relative price of 
good 2 which the South imports. The budget constraints of consumers are: 
 * *1 2 1 2,  and  *,X pX I X pX I+ = + =  
where I and I* are incomes in terms of the numéraire good of the South and the North. 
Let 1 1( , )X X p I=  and 2 2 ( , )X X p I=  denote the demand functions for good 1 and 2 in the 
South, and * *1 1 ( , *)X X p I=  and * *2 2 ( , *)X X p I= for the North.  Indirect utility functions are 
written as: 
* *
1 2 1 2( , ) [ ( , ), ( , )],  and  *( , *) *[ ( , ), ( , *)],V p I U X p I X p I V p I U X p I X p I≡ ≡  
where national incomes are given by 
 * *1 2 1 2,  and  * .I Y pY I Y pY= + = +  
The world market clearing price of good 2 is implicitly defined by 
 * *2 2 2 2( , ) ( , *).Y Y X p I X p I+ = +  (8) 
Summing the budget constraints of the two countries, we get  
 * * * *1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).p X X p X X p Y Y p Y Y+ + + = + + +  
If market 2 clears for a given p, market 1 does as well by Walras Law. 
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3. Factor Growth and Terms of Trade 
How does labor growth affect the terms of trade? Producer revenue 1 2R Y pY= +  is 
distributed to consumers as factor incomes. Partially differentiating consumer income 
1 2I Y pY= +  with respect to L and allowing endogenous price changes, we have 
 ( )1 2 2 ,L L L LI Y pY Y p= + +  
where / , / ,L LI I L p p L≡ ∂ ∂ ≡ ∂ ∂ /iL iY Y L≡ ∂ ∂  and /iK iY Y K≡ ∂ ∂ . Labor growth in the South 
not only increases the regional income but also affects the North’s income through a change 
in the terms of trade. 
 * *2 .L LI Y p=  
Similarly, 
 ( )* * * ** 1 * 2 2 *,L L L LI Y pY Y p= + +  and * 2 *,L LI Y p=  
where ** * / *LI I L≡ ∂ ∂  and * / *.Lp p L= ∂ ∂  
Factor growth affects consumption through changes in income and the terms of trade. 
Differentiating 2 ( , )X p I and 
*
2 ( , *)X p I with respect to p yields 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
2 2 2 1 2 .
p L I L p I I L I L L
U
p I L I L L
X X p X I X X X QX p X Y pY
L
X QX p X Y pY
∂ = + = + − + +∂
= − + +
 (9) 
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( ) ( )
( )
*
* * * * * * * * *2
2 2 * 2 2 2 * 2 2 2 2 *
* * * *
2 2 * 2 2 *
( )
* .
p I L p I I
U U
p I p I L
X X X Y p X X X X Y X
L
X Q X X QX p
∂ = + = + − −∂
= − = +
 (10) 
where the South’s excess demand is 2 2 ,Q X Y= − the North’s excess demand * *2 2 * ,Q X Y= −  
whereas the slope of the South’s compensated demand curve is 2 2 2 2
U
p p IX X X X= + is, and 
*
2
U
pX  is similarly defined for the North. 
Producer revenue is distributed to consumers as labor and rental incomes,  
 1 2 .R Y pY wL rK= + = +  (11) 
Note that labor growth can affect revenue by changing the product mix and through a change 
in the terms of trade. The effect of factor growth on producer revenue can be obtained by 
partially differentiating (11) with respect to L,4 
 1 2 .L L
R Y pY w
L
∂ = + =∂  (12) 
That is, an additional worker raises national income by his annual wage even when p is 
endogenous. Let ( ) ( ,1)i ix p X p≡ denote the South’s demand for good i when income is unity. 
Given identical and homothetic preferences, income elasticity of demand for each good is 
unity. Thus, *( ) ( ),i ix p x p= and 
 *2 2 2 2( , ) ( ) ,  and  ( , *) ( ) *,X p I x p I X p I x p I= =  
which implies *2 * 2 2( ) .I IX x p X= =  Combining (9) and (10) and using (12), 
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 ( )* *2 2 2 2 2( ) .U Up p L IX X X X p wXL∂ + = + +∂  (13) 
Differentiating the left side of (8), we get 
 ( )* *2 2 2 2 2( ) .L p p LY Y Y Y Y pL∂ + = + +∂  (14) 
Equating (13) and (14), we have 
 2 2*
2 2
0,L IL U U
p p
Y wXp
D D
−= >+  (15) 
where 2 2 2
U U
p p pD X Y= − and  * * *2 2 2U Up p pD X Y= − are the slopes of compensated excess demands 
for good 2. Similarly, for the North, 
 
* *
2 2
* *
2 2
0.L IL U U
p p
Y wXp
D D
−= >+  (16) 
Note that 1 1 2 2( ) 0,  ( ) 0,I IX x p X x p= > = > and 2 0LY < by the Rybczynski Theorem. The 
North exports good 2 and 2 1/p p p≡  represents the North’s terms of trade. Thus, whether it 
occurs in the North or the South, labor growth raises the price of the capital intensive good 
and improves the North’s terms of trade.  
Let ( / )( / )( 0)w p p wη ≡ ∂ ∂ < denote the price elasticity of the wage. By the Samuelson 
(1953) Reciprocity relation, 2 / / .LY w p w pη= ∂ ∂ =  Thus, 
 2 *
2 2
( ) 0.L U U
p p
w xpp
L D D
η −∂≡ = >∂ +  
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Given factor price equalization and identical technologies, / * /w p w p∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ and 
* ( * / )( / ).w p p wη η= ≡ ∂ ∂  Thus, 
 
*
2 2
* *
2 2 2 2
*( * ) ( ) .
* U U U Up p p p
w x w xp p
L D D D D L
η η− −∂ ∂= = =∂ + + ∂  (17) 
Thus, labor growth has the same effect on the North’s terms of trade whether it occurs in the 
North or South. 
Carrying out a similarly analysis on capital input, we get,  
 2 2*
2 2
,K IU U
p p
Y rXp
K D D
−∂ =∂ +  (18) 
 
* *
2 * 2
*
2 2
.
*
K I
U U
p p
Y rXp
K D D
−∂ =∂ +  (19) 
 By the reciprocity relation, we have 2 / .KY r p= ∂ ∂  A change in p has a magnification 
effect on r. Let ( / )( / )( 1)r p p rε ≡ ∂ ∂ > denote the price elasticity of rent. Thus, 
 2 / .KY r pε=  
The budget constraint implies 1 2 1.x px+ =  Differentiating 2 2( , ) ( )X p I x p I≡  with respect to 
I gives 2 2 1(1 ) / ,IX x x p= = −  and (18) can be rewritten as 
 ( )1 *2 2
( 1 ) 0.
U U
p p
r xp
K p D D
ε − +∂ = <∂ +  (20) 
Given factor price equalization, / * /r p r p∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ , *,ε ε=  and 
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 ( )
*
1
*
2 2
( 1 ) 0,
* *U Up p
r xp p
K Kp D D
ε − +∂ ∂= = <∂ ∂+  (21) 
Note that due to the magnification effect, 1.ε > Thus, whether it occurs in the North or South 
capital growth worsens the North’s terms of trade. An increment of capital has the same 
effect on the terms of trade whether it occurs on the North or South.  
 
Properties of the Autarky Price 
Tadeus Rybczynski (1955, p. 340) was aware that factor growth lowers the autarky 
relative price of the good which intensively uses that factor. The effect of factor growth on 
the South’s autarky price can be obtained from (15) and (18) by removing the North’s 
production and consumption. Specifically,   
 2 2 2 2
2 2
0,    0.L I K IU U
p p
Y wX Y rXp p
L D K D
− −∂ ∂= > = <∂ ∂  
We now show that a proportionate increase in factor endowments has no effect on the 
autarky price of good 2.5 Let /k K L=  denote the South’s capital-labor ratio, which is now 
held constant. Differentiating p with respect to L while allowing K to increase, we have 
 2 2 2
2
( ) 0.L K IU
p
LY KY wL rK Xdp p pk
dL L L LD
+ − +∂ ∂= + = =∂ ∂  
To see this, first recall from (3) ( , )iY K L is homogeneous of degree 1 in factor endowments, 
i.e., 2 2 2.L KLY KY Y+ =  Next, 2 2 ( )IX x p=  and 2 2( ) .IwL rK X X+ =  
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Once factor prices are equalized, even though the factors are internationally 
immobile, the world market behaves as a single country with global resource endowments 
( *, *).L L K K+ +  Equilibrium price depends on the aggregate capital-labor ratio,   
 ( )( *) /( *) .p h K K L L= + +  (22) 
A proportionate increase in the global capital and labor inputs has no effect on the terms of 
trade. Using (22) and the Stolper-Samuelson results in (7), we may write the equalized factor 
prices as functions of p, 
 * *( ) , ( ) .
* *o o
K K K Kw w p f r r p g
L L L L
+ +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= = = =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  (23) 
Thus,  
 
2 2 2 2
0,   0,   0,   0.o o o oL L K K
w r w rw r w rp p p p
L p L p K p L p
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= < = > = > = <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  (24) 
The effects of factor growth on autarky prices can also be obtained by removing the foreign 
factor endowments in (23) and the signs remain the same,  
 
2 2 2 2
0,   0,   0,   0.A A A AL L K K
w r w rw r w rp p p p
L p L p K p L p
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= < = > = > = <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  (25) 
Thus, a growing factor necessarily brings about a decline in its autarky price, while the 
Rybczynski Theorem holds in a small open economy facing constant prices. Moreover, labor 
growth necessarily lowers the equalized wage rate and capital growth the equalized rental 
rate, whether the growth occurs in the South or North. 
The following propositions summarize these results. 
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Proposition 1: Whether it occurs in the North or the South, an increase in the labor 
endowment improves the North’s terms of trade, while an increase in capital endowment 
worsens them. 
 
Proposition 2: Factor growth has the same effect on the terms of trade, regardless of where it 
occurs, i.e., 
 0,  and  0.
*
p p p p
L L K K
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= > = <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
 
Proposition 3: The terms of trade depends only on the global capital-labor ratio, i.e.,  
 ( ) ( *) /( *) .op h K K L L= + +  
 
Proposition 4: Labor growth lowers the equalized wage rate and raises the equalized rental 
rate, and capital growth has the opposite effects on factor prices, whether growth occurs in 
the North or South. 
4. Levels of Equalized Factor Prices 
If two countries establish a free trade area, will the equalized wage and rental rates be 
a weighted average of their autarky factor prices? Suppose 1p is held constant, and let 2 Ap  
and 2Bp  now denote the autarky prices of good 2 in the South and the North, respectively. 
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Free trade ensures that equilibrium 2op lies between the two autarky prices, 2 Ap  and 2 .Bp  
That is,  
 2 2 2(1 ) ,o A Bp p pμ μ= + −  (26) 
where 0 1.μ< <  In a similar fashion, let ( , )A Aw r  and ( , )B Bw r  now denote the autarky factor 
prices of the South and the North, and let ( , )o ow r  denote the equalized factor prices. Since 
the equalized factor prices are trapped between their autarky levels, there exist 
 and w rθ θ such that 
 
(1 ) ,    0 1,
(1 ) ,    0 1,
o w A w B w
o r A r B r
w w w
r r r
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
= + − < <
= + − < <
 
but .w rθ θ≠   
Does there exist a common weight  (0 1)θ θ< <  such that 
 ( , ) ( , ) (1 )( , )?o o A A B Bw r w r w rθ θ= + −  
The unit cost functions, 1( , )p w r and 2 ( , )p w r , are concave in factor prices.
6 By Jensen’s 
inequality, we have  
 ( )2 2 2 2(1 ) , (1 ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , ) .A B A B A A B B op w w r r p w r p w r pμ μ μ μ μ μ+ − + − > + − =  
That is, if the autarky factor prices ( , )A Aw r  and ( , )B Bw r  had the same weights, μ  and 
(1 )μ− , as the autarky output prices, the resulting 2p  will be “too high” in the sense that it is 
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greater than the equalized output price. However, the equalized factor prices ( , )o ow r are a 
positive linear combination of the autarky factor prices, i.e., there exists Aλ and Bλ such that7 
 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ).o o A A A B B Bw r w r w rλ λ= ⋅ + ⋅  (27) 
If the equalized factor prices were a convex combination of the two autarky factor prices, the 
sum of the two weights ( A Bλ λ+ ) would be unity. We now show that the equalized factor 
prices are “less” than a convex combination, i.e., the sum of the weights is less than one, 
1.A Bλ λ+ <   
Note that the price of the numéraire is fixed and the equalized factor prices must 
satisfy the constraint 1( , ) 1.p w r = 8 Since 1( , )p w r is a concave function, the factor price 
frontier or the contour of ( , )w r along the curve 1( , ) 1p w r = is convex to the origin and lies 
below the line connecting two autarky factor prices, ( , )A Aw r and ( , )B Bw r . Any point along 
the latter line in Figure 1 is a convex combination of the autarky factor prices, and hence  
1.A Bλ λ+ =  However, since the price of the numéraire is fixed, the equalized factor prices 
must move along curve 1( , ) 1p w r = .  
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Figure 1. Equalized factor prices and autarky factor prices 
These results are summarized below: 
 
Proposition 5: Let the equalized price 2 2 2(1 )o A Bp p pμ μ= + −  and equalized rent 
(1 )o A Br r rρ ρ= + −  be weighted averages of autarky prices and rents of the North and the 
South. Then  
(i) ( )2 2(1 ) , (1 ) ,A B A B op w w r r pμ μ μ μ+ − + − >  and 
(ii) the equalized factor prices are less than a convex combination of the autarky factor 
prices, i.e., ( , ) ( , ) ( , ),   1.o o A A A B B B A Bw r w r w rλ λ λ λ= ⋅ + ⋅ + <  
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Proposition 5 has an important implication on the equalized factor prices. If developed 
economies have free trade with developing regions such as Asia and Africa, the resulting 
equalized factor prices will be “less” than a convex combination of autarky prices of the 
developed and developing economies.  
Consider a numerical example. Suppose factor endowments of China are 
( , ) (600,2000)B BL K = and those of America are ( , ) (150,20000).A AL K =  Workers are 
measured in millions and capital stock is measured in terms of the numéraire. In this 
situation, China’s capital stock is one-tenth of the U.S. capital stock, whereas China’s labor 
force is four times the U.S. counterpart. Assume that the two countries have identical utility 
functions, 1 2 ,U X X=  and identical Cobb-Douglas production functions: i ii i iy K Lα β=  with 
1 1( , ) (1/ 4,3/ 4)α β =  and 2 2( , ) (3 / 4,1/ 4).α β =  In this case, 2 19k k= , i.e., industry 2 is nine 
times more capital intensive than industry 1. As shown in Table 1, when 1 1,p =  the autarky 
price p of the capital-intensive good is $0.5477 in China and $0.0866 in America. The 
detailed derivation used in Table 1 is in the Appendix. The equilibrium price under free trade 
is $0.1846, and China’s weight in determining the world equilibrium price is Bμ  = 21.26%. 
China’s autarky factor prices are ( , ) (0.7700,0.2310)B Bw r = , and America’s are 
( , ) (1.9365,0.0145)A Aw r = . The equalized factor prices are: 
 ( , ) (1.3262,0.0452) 0.1566( , ) 0.6226( , ).o o B B A Aw r w r w r= = +  
The sum of the weights is 0.7792 1B Aλ λ+ = <  as predicted by Proposition 5. The equalized 
factor prices are “less” than a convex combination of autarky factor prices. 
 18
5. Concluding Remarks 
In the present Doha Round of trade negotiations developing countries have asked 
developed nations to liberalize agricultural trade so that they would have access to the 
markets of developed economies. Increased trade between populous regions of Asia and 
Africa and capital abundant regions of Europe and America will exert its pressure to reduce 
wage and rent gaps between the two regions. True, the equalized wage rate will be a convex 
combination of pre-trade wage rates, and the equalized rent is another weighted average of 
autarky rental rates, but the weights for rental and wage will be different. When a single 
weight is chosen for both autarky factor prices of each country, the equalized factor prices 
will be “less” than a weighted average of autarky factor prices, i.e., the sum of the weights 
for autarky factor prices of the two countries is less than unity. 
The Cobb-Douglas case in Appendix is particularly interesting in that the factor price 
outcomes are independent of factor shares. The weights of the equalized wage-rent ratio are 
simply the population ratios. For instance, if the South is five times as populous as the North, 
the weight of the South’s autarky wage-rent ratio is 5/6 and that of the North 1/6. The HO 
model assumes capital is mobile only between industries but increased capital mobility will 
further expedite rental equalization. This example paints a grim picture that in the absence of 
technological improvements, workers in the North should expect their wage to decline 
significantly when trading with populous regions, such as China and India. 
This paper also points out that it is not possible for the capital-abundant North to 
grow without spilling the benefits of capital accumulation on the labor-abundant South.  
Capital growth necessarily worsens the North’s terms of trade, and labor growth the South’s.  
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Appendix 
This appendix illustrates Proposition 2 using Cobb-Douglas production and utility 
functions. Assume that the two countries have identical Cobb-Douglas production 
functions: i ii i iy K L
α β=  with 1 1( , ) (1/ 4,3/ 4)α β =  and 2 2( , ) (3 / 4,1/ 4).α β =  Consumers have 
identical Cobb-Douglas utility functions: 1 2U X X=  and * *1 2* .U X X=  From the cost 
minimization problems, we have 
 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2,    ,wL p y wL p yβ β= =  
 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2,    .rK p y rK p yα α= =  
Thus,  
 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 2
/ .
/
p y L k kw
r p y K
β β β
α α α= = =  (28) 
It follows that 
 2 1,k kφ=  (29) 
where 1 2 2 1/ .φ β α β α=  From the resource constraints, we have 
 1 1 1 2 2 2 ,p y p y wLβ β+ =  (30) 
 1 1 1 2 2 2 .p y p y rKα α+ =  (31) 
Let 1 2 1 2 2 1.δ β α α β α α≡ − = −  Then  
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 2 2 1 11 1 2 2,    ,
wL rK rK wLp y p yα β β α− −= =Δ Δ  
which shows the Rybczynski Theorem. In autarky, 1 1,y x=  or 
 2 2
1
.
2
wL rKwL rK
p
α β
δ
−+ =  
Thus, the wage-rent ratio is: 
 ,w K
r L
γ=  (32) 
where 1 2 1 2(2 ) /( ) 0.γ α α α α= − − + >  Also, from (28) and (29), we have 
 1 21 2,    ,
K Kk k
L L
σ σ= =  (33) 
where 1 1 1/σ γα β≡  and 2 2 2/ .σ γα β≡  
Industry outputs are written as: 
 1 21 1 1 2 2 2( ) ,    ( ) .y L k y L k
α α= =  (34) 
Thus,  
 1 1 2 1 2
2 2 1 2 1
.y L Kp p
y L K
β α
β α= =  (35) 
Using (34) and the first equality in (35), we get 
 1 22 1 2
1
.p k kα αββ
−=  
 21
Using (29) and (33), we have 
 
2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1
1 2
( / ) .p k
α
α α β αβ β α β
−
− ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 21 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) .p k K L K L
α α β α α α β α α αβ β α α σ β β α α ω σ− − −= = = (36) 
where 2 21 2 1 2( / ) ( ) 0.
β αω β β α α≡ >  Note that p is a concave function of L, but a convex 
function of K. That is, an increase in L increases p at a decreasing rate, while an increase in K 
lowers p at a decreasing rate.   Note that since 2 1,α α>  in (36) autarky price p  is a 
decreasing function of ( / )K L  as shown in Proposition 2. Also, a proportionate increase in 
capital and labor inputs has no effect on the terms of trade. 
While the calculation is tedious, expressions for the wage and rent can be obtained 
from (36).  First, note that 1 2 2 21 1 2 1 2( / ) ( / ) .k p
α α β αβ β α α− − −=  Thus, 
 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 11/( ) /( ) /( )1 1 2 1 2( / ) ( / ) .k p
α α β α α α α αβ β α α− − − −=  (37) 
From (34), 11 1 1 ,w p k
αβ=  or 
 1 2 1/( ) ,ww p
α α α φ− −=  (38) 
where 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1/( ) /( )1 1 2 1 2( / ) ( / ) 0.w
α β α α α α α αφ β β β α α− −≡ >  This illustrates the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem. If industry 2 is capital intensive ( 2 1α α> ), an increase in the price of the capital-
intensive good lowers w. Differentiating (38) with respect to p twice yields: 
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2 2 1
1 2
/( )1
2 1
2
21 2
2 2
2 1
0,
0.
( )
w
w
w p
p
w p
p
α α α
α α
α φ
α α
α α φ
α α
− −
−
∂ = − <∂ −
∂ = >∂ −
 
This implies that the wage function ( )w f p= is convex in p. Jensen’s inequality implies  
 ( )( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ).o A B A Bw p w p p w p w pμ μ μ μ= + − < + −  (39) 
Thus, in the Cobb-Douglas case, the equalized wage rate at the free trade equilibrium is less 
than the weighted average of autarky wage rates, using the same weights for the equalized 
price. That is, the equalized wage rate is closer to the wage of the low-wage or labor 
abundant country than the weights of the equalized output price suggest. 
The expression for the autarky rent is given by 11 1 1 ,r p k
βα −=  or 
 1 2 1/( ) ,rr p
β α α φ−=  (40) 
where 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1/( ) /( )1 1 2 1 2( / ) ( / ) 0.r
β α α α β β α αφ α α α β β− − − −≡ >  Differentiating (40) with respect to p 
twice, we have 
 
1 2 1
2 2 1
/( )1
2 1
2
/( )1 1
2
2 1
0,
0.
rr p
p
r p
p
α α α
α α α
β φ
α α
α β
α α
− −
− −
∂ = >∂ −
∂ = − <∂ −
 
Thus, ( )r p  is a concave function of p. By Jensen’s inequality,  
 ( )( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ).o A B A Br p r p p r p r pμ μ μ μ= + − > + −  (41) 
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Thus, the equalized rent is greater than the weighted average of the autarky rents using the 
weights of the equalized output price for the Cobb-Douglas case. That is, the equalized rent 
is closer to the autarky rent of the labor-abundant country than the weights of the equalized 
output price suggest. 
From (27), we obtain the weights for the equalized factor prices, 
 ,    .B C B C A C A CA B
A B A B A B A B
r w w r w r r w
w r r w w r r w
λ λ− −= =− −  
In the above example, 0.1566Bλ ≅  and 0.6226.Aλ ≅  The weights of the equalized output 
price are, 0.2126Bμ ≅  and 0.7814,Aμ ≅  which add up to unity. Proposition 5 only predicts 
that 1,A Bλ λ+ <  and the Cobb-Douglas case confirms it.    
Wage-Rent Ratio  
From (32), the autarky wage-rent ratio of the South is given by / / .A A A Aw r K Lγ=  For 
the North, / / .B B B Bw r K Lγ=  Under free trade, the equalized wage-rent ratio is 
 .o A B
o A B
w K K
r L L
γ += +  
Then it can be shown that in the Cobb-Douglas case, the free trade wage-rent ratio is a 
weighted average of the autarky wage-rent ratios, 
 .C A A B B
C A B A A B B
w L w L w
r L L r L L r
= ++ +  (42) 
where /( )A A BL L L+  and /( )B A BL L L+  are the labor shares of the South and the North, 
respectively. For example, when ( , ) (600,2000)B BL K = and ( , ) (150,20000)A AL K = , China’s 
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population is four times the U.S. population but its capital stock is one-tenth of the U.S. 
capital stock. The autarky wage-rent ratio is 3.33 in China and 133.33 in the United States. 
The latter is 40 times that of the former. The equalized wage-rent ratio is 29.33. In 
determining the equilibrium output price, China’s weight is only about 21%, but for the 
equalized wage-rent ratio, China’s weight is 80%. That is, the equalized wage-rent ratio is 
closer to China’s autarky level while the equalized output price is closer to America’s 
autarky level.  
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Table 1. Equalized Factor Prices in the Cobb-Douglas Case 
  US China World weight 
L 150 600 750  
K 20,000 2,000 22000  
α1 0.25 0.25 0.25 
α2 0.75 0.75 0.75  
β1 0.75 0.75 0.75  
β2 0.25 0.25 0.25  
ε 1 1 1  
A1 0.438691338 0.438691338 0.438691338  
B1 1.316074013 1.316074013 1.316074013  
θ 0.577350269 0.577350269 0.577350269  
q 0.577350269 0.577350269 0.577350269  
w/r 133.3333333 3.333333333 29.33333333  
s1 0.333333333 0.333333333 0.333333333  
σ2 3 3 3  
k1 44.44444444 1.111111111 9.777777778 
k2 400 10 88  
s1K/L 44.44444444 1.111111111 9.777777778  
p eq 0.08660254 0.547722558 0.184637236 0.212601259
p confirm 0.08660254 0.547722558 0.184637236  
p1 1 1 1  
w b1p1k1a1 1.936491673 0.770017572 1.326237501 0.523161355
r a1p1k1-b1 0.014523688 0.231005272 0.045212642 0.141762426
Λ     0.43615629  
λ   0.156577005 
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λ*     0.622605546  
      0.779182552  
y1A 290.473751 462.0105432 994.678126  
y2A 3354.101966 843.5119878 5387.202197  
p aut 0.08660254 0.547722558 0.184637236  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 For extensions to higher dimensions, see for instance, Ethier (1984), Neary (1985), and 
Choi (2003). 
2 Due to inability to predict the commodity trade pattern in a world with more than two 
goods, some developed a fifth proposition, the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theorem, which 
predicts that a country exports the services of its abundant facto through trade. 
3 For income convergence, see Rassekh and Thompson (1997) and Slaughter (1998). 
4 Even when factor prices respond to a change in L, as Henry Thompson pointes out, cost 
minimization implies 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) .dR wdL L L dw K K dr wdL= + + + + =  
5 This result on autarky price was shown in Jones (1965). See also Batra (1973). 
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6 It is well known that the cost function is concave in all factor prices, not just in w and r. 
Thus, the argument holds for many factor prices. A diagram is used only for illustrative 
purposes. 
7 These weights are in the Appendix.  
 
8 It does not matter which good is used as a numéraire because it is the convexity of factor 
price frontiers that drives the result. 
